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Summary:  The  aim  of  our  paper  is  to  determine  the  efficiency  of  asymmetric 
regulation  of  mobile  termination  rates  (MTRs)  in  a  market  where  firms  are 
differentiated  in  size  and  with  commercial  offers  including  calling  club  effects. 
Major  regulatory  issues  are  related  to  these  analyses,  since  some  European 
National Regulatory Authorities and the European Commission tend to question 
asymmetric regulation mechanisms. Based on a model designed to determine firm 
profits and consumer surplus, our main results are the following: a) Asymmetric 
regulation of MTRs may contribute to increase welfare. If the impact is neutral 
regarding firms (simple reallocation of profits from the large to the small player), 
consumer surplus is increased; b) The appropriate way to proceed is to decrease 
the large firm’s MTRs, rather than increasing the smaller firm’s ones, which could 
produce  negative  side  effects;  c)  From  a  dynamic  point  of  view,  appropriate 
asymmetric regulation may contribute to balance market shares and, in such a way, 
to compensate first mover advantages.  
 
 
1  Introduction 
As consumers are usually ignorant on Mobile Termination Rates (MTRs), collusion is a 
major concern in their setting. Starting from the works of Laffont, Rey & Tirole (1998 
a, b) and Armstrong (1998), the general result obtained is that firm symmetry in market 
shares  have  incentives  to  increase  their  access  charges  in  a  logic  of  “double 
marginalization”. Furthermore, size symmetry may facilitate collusion, even without 
having recourse to access charges. 
If  these  results  are  consistent  for  symmetric  firms,  one  may  wonder  whether  the 
reasoning should be modified when considering asymmetries. Indeed, asymmetric firms 
may have conflicting aims leading to more fragile collusive equilibriums. Thus, moving 
from  “symmetry”  to  “asymmetry”  to  determine  the  effects  of  setting  MTRs,  and 
appropriate regulation, does not mean modifying a minor assumption. Recent works 
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(Benzoni  2007,  Dewenter  2007)  highlight  that  European  mobile  markets  are  still 
impacted by first mover advantages, leading to long lasting asymmetries, taking such 
asymmetries into account is essential to determine appropriate regulation. 
Regarding  these  issues,  the  conventional  approach  is  that,  in  the  early  period  of 
liberalization, asymmetric regulation (meaning differentiation of MTRs between mobile 
operators) is necessary to help entrants be competitive with the incumbent. Nonetheless, 
in the long run, when entrants are well established in the market, asymmetric regulation 
should be replaced by symmetric regulation of access charges at cost. This principle has 
been widely used by National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) throughout Europe in the 
determination of MTRs to account for sequential market entry across all EU Member 
States. Nevertheless this differentiated treatment of mobile network operators’ MTR has 
been increasingly questioned by Member States. At the root of needs for a “sunset 
clause” on MTR asymmetry is the belief that initial disadvantages for the later entrants 
have either become negligible or are related to inefficient market entry, so that they may 
no longer be justified from a welfare point of view.  
In  the  context  of  this  regulatory  debate,  the  aim  of  our  paper  is  the  following:  to 
determine, with a model designed to consider asymmetric mobile operators proposing 
offers with a calling club effect, if asymmetric regulation of MTRs is consistent with an 
increase of consumer surplus and, in a dynamic perspective, efficient to balance market 
shares. 
We will proceed as follows. After a literature review in section 2, our model will be 
presented in section 3. In section 4, we will carry out a simulation to highlight the main 
effect  of  asymmetric  regulation  on  both  welfare  and  market  equilibrium.  Research 
perspectives will be defined in conclusion. 
 
2  Literature Review 
Research on MTRs came to light in 1998, when both Laffont-Rey-Tirole (LRT from 
now on 1998 a, b) and Armstrong (1998) were published as milestone works. From then 
on, and up through the most recent working papers, two concerns have been always 
paid attention to: the collusive role of access charges and the advantage that larger or 
incumbent firms derived from this access charges framework. Miscellaneous factors 
have gradually been integrated into the research to fit with various market hypotheses. 
Regarding  the  risks  of  collusion,  Armstrong  (1998)  indicated  that  for  high  access 
charges,  symmetric  operators  use  this  tool  to  fuel  their  collusion  in  a  linear  tariff 
scenario that resembles the result of LRT (1998a). This point shows that equilibrium What Mobile Termination Regime for Asymmetric Firms with a Calling Club Effect? 
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between two firms can’t be reached when either access charges or substitutability are 
too  high,  whereas  negotiated  access  prices  can  effectively  lower  this  level  of 
competition. Both Armstrong (1998) and LRT (1998a) evoke two part tariffs. With two 
part tariffs, however, access charges will not lower competition since it can lead to an 
increase in the cost per minute and not on the fixed price of a subscription. Operators 
can thus lower tariffs for fixed prices. 
Another point regards inter-network and intra-network price discrimination and is put 
forward  by  LRT  (1998b).  They  stress  the  network  effects  in  the  presence  of  such 
discrimination between two identical services, effects called “tariff mediated network 
externalities”.  On  a  market  where  operators  act  symmetrically,  this  discrimination 
should be rewarded since welfare is increased. 
For Carter and Wright (1999), the impact of brand loyalty is introduced to analyze 
unequal competition, but neither the on-net/off-net price discrimination nor club effects 
are accounted for. Given this framework, collusion by setting interconnection charges 
can be retained and non-reciprocal access charges can be used to set up market entry 
barriers.  In  their  subsequent  work,  Carter  and  Wright  (2003)  assess  an  asymmetric 
market with brand loyalty. The authors state that incumbents with brand loyalty prefer 
cost-based access fees. Nevertheless, if brand loyalty is strong enough, all competitors 
have the same preference for cost-based access fees. 
According to Gans and King (2001), both cost-based access charges and the bill-and-
keep mode can be used to reduce competition. In a two part tariff structure, mobile 
network operators can benefit from a high subscription charge in spite of low (meaning, 
lower than marginal cost) access charges, since the latter reduces the appeal for new 
subscribers. Their points of view are opposed by Cambini and Valletti (2003) who tend 
to prove that the bill-and-keep mode can be beneficial to the social welfare due to 
positive impact of quality-focussed investments. 
Call  externality  is  another  dimension  in  this  literature  family  and  is  considered  by 
Berger (2004, 2005) for linear and two-part tariff situations. The author concludes that, 
given linear tariffs on a symmetric market, competitors will still have the incentive to 
collude if access charges are set below cost and if on-net prices are below off-net prices. 
In  the  two-part  tariff  scenario,  he  demonstrates  that  the  bill-and-keep  mode  can 
effectively raise welfare compared to the cost-based mode. 
Dewenter (2005) focuses on the regulation of access charges in his work on markets 
presenting  asymmetries  in  firm  size.  Based  on  the  hypothesis  that  customers  are 
ignorant  about  calling  number  termination,  access  charges  tend  to  be  higher  since 
network  externality  is  more  evident,  in  accordance  with  Gans  and  King  (2000). 
Dewenter  also  introduces  asymmetry  in  competitor  size  as  well  as  concomitant What Mobile Termination Regime for Asymmetric Firms with a Calling Club Effect? 
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regulation asymmetry. The results show that smaller operators can justify their increase 
in  access  charges  since  they  have  no  significant  influence  on  the  wholesale  price. 
Further, if larger operators are regulated unilaterally, the smaller operators may raise 
their access charge. 
On these matters, Peitz (2005) insists on non-reciprocal regulation in an asymmetric 
market allowing entrants to charge a higher access fee compared to the incumbents. 
This  framework  will  be  socially  desirable  as  it  favours  both  new  entrants  and 
consumers’ surplus. 
The emphasis of Hoernig (2007) lies in the differential between on-net and off-net tariff 
with the presence of receiving calls’ utility. Equilibrium in this context proves to be 
dependant on firms’ market share. Larger firms will consciously or not charge a higher 
off-net price, either under a linear or two-part tariff. The author also glimpses at the 
possibility of predatory pricing behaviour when that differential increases to a certain 
threshold. 
In another recent paper, Gabrielsen & Vagstad (2007) explain how the calling club 
effect  and  switching  costs  influence  a  symmetric  market.  They  show  that  within  a 
symmetric market with reciprocal access charges, certain configurations of switching 
costs and access charges can lead to collusion instead of waging price wars against each 
other. 
Our paper, on integrating certain practical market hypotheses, provides an overview on 
linear  tariff  competition  between  an  incumbent  and  a  later  entrant.  Call  externality, 
mentioned in Berger’s two articles, is comprised in our modelling together with the 
calling club effect. Our goal is to discuss, within this given setting, the significance of 
regulating  interconnection  terminal  charges  and  the  possibility  to  re-establish  the 
symmetry in the marketplace in accordance with the caution behind the “sunset clause”. 
 
3  The Model  
In our research, we set up our model on the base of LRT (1998 a,b) and Armstrong 
(1998). Other factors are also integrated to make the present model closer to certain real 
observed cases (persistent asymmetries in firms’ sizes and diffusion of offers with club 
effects). What Mobile Termination Regime for Asymmetric Firms with a Calling Club Effect? 
 
  
                                        5   
•  Consumer  
Two differentiated network operators are located “à la Hotelling” at two ends of a unit 
line  along  which  customers  are  uniformly  distributed.  In  order  to  represent  market 
asymmetries,  we  have  adopted  the  method  proposed  in  Behringer  (2006)  where 
subscribers derive different benefits from the selected network. 
Firm 1, located at point 0, has a smaller user group compared to firm 2, located in the 
other end. Their market shares are noted separately as  2 1 α α , and  1 2 1 = +α α . Each 
subscriber, whose location is different from 0 or 1, suffers from “undesirability” for not 
having the exact tailored service. Such undesirability is calculated by the distance from 
his location to that of the network multiplied by a transport cost t. This means that, if a 
customer  at  point  x  has  subscribed  to  the  service  of  network  2,  his  undesirability 
is x t − 1 .  Another  way  to  express  t  is  to  use 
t 2
1
= σ  which  denotes  substitutability 
between networks and, by the way, market competition. 
Behringer  (2006)  used  a  differentiated  utility  amplifier  factorη.  Here  we  adapt  his 
method by adding this factor  1 < β  exclusively for firm 2, incumbent as a first mover 
advantage. Thus, the undesirability of a customer at x suffers  x ∗
σ 2
1
 if he subscribes to 









we believe that this disequilibrium can better embody the network effect instead of a 
brand loyalty effect. 
Thus,  in  our  “à la Hotelling”  model,  the  market  divides  where  the  customer  feels 
indifferent in choosing either side in terms of his welfare. Incumbent, firm 2, enjoys its 
advantage by less undesirability. 
 
•  Cost, price and utility 
Each  customer  will  incur  a  fixed  cost  i f  for  network  i,  and  each  call,  despite  the 
destination, adds a per-minute-cost  0 1 0 c c c c + + =   
€ 
c0 is the cost of originating and terminating a call whereas  1 c  is the cost of transmitting 
a call. Let’s assume that both firms carry out their activities with the same cost.  j a is the What Mobile Termination Regime for Asymmetric Firms with a Calling Club Effect? 
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access charge if one call happens to originate from network i and terminate on network j 
and network i pays j. Therefore a perceived cost of an off-net call can be represented as 
0 c a c c j off
i − + =  
As the utility expression is concerned, we adopt the “traditional” way that began at LRT 
(1998 a,b) and other followers:  











= q q u                                                    (1)  
At the same time, when a customer is called, he also receives a certain utility that is 
proportioned  to  the  caller’s.  We  note  thereby  ( ) ( ) q u q u ∗ =τ  as  the  corresponding 
utility. 
η − = p p q ) (                                                                (2) 








) ( p p u                                           (3) 
( ) ( ) ( ) pq q u p v q − = max                                           (4)                                                                                        









) ( p p v                                                      (5) 
Network operator i charges( ) ij ii i p p F , , , the first is the fixed payment that supports the 
fixed cost of providing the service as well as the source of profit (to be proven further 
on). If we consider the linear tariff, then F=0. ( ) ij ii p p ,  is the retail price for on-net and 
off-net calls, otherwise the triplet combines to make the payment structure. 
Thus, the costs are classically divided into three parts: originating, transmitting and 
terminating, the last of which will be replaced by the MTR as a perceived cost. Quantity 
of consuming is a nonlinear function of price, and utility is also linked by consumed 
quantity. 
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•  Calling club effect 
Consumer behaviour breaks down into two categories as indicated by Gabrielsen and 
Vagstad (2007): “Tribe” calls and other calls which obey a balanced call pattern, i.e. the 
probability to call a subscriber is strictly equal. The significance of introducing a calling 
club comes from the observation in the European mobile market where more and more 
operators have already implemented a tribe numbers policy. The main idea is to offer a 
special price for one subscriber to call a certain fixed number of destinations, which 
might be his friends, his family or somebody with an important and steady demand for 
communication. 
The  prerequisite  of  such  an  offer  is  that  all  these  subscribers  belong  to  the  same 
operators. The price is normally lower than other calls including on-net and calls are 
sometimes free, and thus labelled as unlimited.  To facilitate modelling, we followed the 
assumption of Gabrielsen and Vagstad (2007) that pricing is fixed at the same level as 
on-net calls
3. The proportion of tribe calls to total calls is a fixed parameter γ , which 
means that any subscriber has a probability of γ  to call on the tribe and ( ) γ − 1  to others 
among which on-net calls and off-net calls are determined by the ratio of market share 
of each network. 
 
•  Market share in equilibrium 
Until now, we can express the utility of a random customer situated at x and subscribing 






1 1 − =                                          (6) 
Where: 
€ 
ω1 = γ1∗ v p11 ( )+ u q11 ( ) ( )+ 1−γ1 ( )∗ α1 v p11 ( )+ u q11 ( ) ( )+α2 v p12 ( )+ u q21 ( ) ( ) [ ]− F 1        (7) 
The utility of a customer at x and subscribing to network 2 is: 




ω                                  (8) 
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€ 
ω2 = γ2 ∗ v p22 ( )+ u q22 ( ) ( )+ 1−γ2 ( )∗ α2 v p22 ( )+ u q22 ( ) ( )+α1 v p21 ( )+ u q12 ( ) ( ) [ ]− F2     (9) 
The  indifferent  user  in  the  Hotelling  model  is  the  point  x  where ( ) ( ) x U x U 2 1 = , 
concretely, this point x is (also the 1 α ): 












= x                       (10) 
In the symmetric situation ( 1 = β ), it is the same as traditional literature. Compared to 





),  utility  is  also  amplified  by
β + 1
2
.    It  is  thus  not  difficult  to  solve  the 
equilibrium market splitting point x is: 
( ) ( ) [ ] ( )[ ] ( ) 1 2 21 1 22 1 2 12 1 11 1 1 22 2 11 1
1
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If we note ( ) ( ) ii ii ii q u p v h + = ;  ( ) ( ) ji ij ij q u p v h + = , then we solve  1 α : 
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
( )( ) ( )( ) [ ] 21 22 2 12 11 1
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 To make the expression clearer: 
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•  Profit and welfare 
The profit of each firm comes from three parts: the fixed fee of subscription (this is 
optional in the linear tariff case); the revenue from calls part is the unforeseen part, 
since  calls  that  fall  in  the  network  or  the  other  together  with  the  tribal  part;  with 
interconnection charges coming from the rival. 
€ 
π i =αiγi pii −c ( )qii +αi 1−γi ( ) αi pii −c ( )qii +α j pij − c + a j −c0 ( ) ( )qij [ ]
+αi Fi − fi ( )+αiα j 1−γ j ( ) ai −c ( )q ji
  (18) 














− = ∫ dx x U                               (19) 














− − = ∫ dx x U          (20) 
It is evident that the incumbent possesses a higher consumer surplus than the competitor 
even in a ceteris paribus situation (equal market share and utility providing ability). 
Total social welfare is: 
€ 
W = π1 + π 2 + CS = α1γ1 +α1
2 1−γ1 ( ) ( )∗ 1+ τ ( )u q11 ( )−cq11 [ ]
+ α2γ2 +α2
2 1−γ2 ( ) ( )∗ 1+ τ ( )u q22 ( )−cq22 [ ]
+α1α2 1−γ1 ( )∗ 1+ τ ( )u q12 ( )−cq12 [ ]+ 1−γ2 ( )∗ 1+ τ ( )u q21 ( )−cq21 [ ] { }












so                      (21) 
It conforms to the Ramsey Benchmark proposed by LRT 1998b. What Mobile Termination Regime for Asymmetric Firms with a Calling Club Effect? 
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4  Equilibrium with asymmetric tribe effect and linear tariff 
In this part, we will study the equilibrium that emerges with different tariff schemes 
from two parts through a simulation. The rule of the game is that two firms separately 
set their own pricing package, including subscription fees, on-net price and off-net price. 
Customers then choose to subscribe to either firm (no right to abandon), resulting in 
subsequent market share, Profit will be calculated based on this data. We, therefore, 
assume that throughout this “game” the two firms are non-cooperative meaning the 
Cournot-Nash equilibrium will be established.  
We will first determine how the market will be split if the incumbent possesses a larger 
tribe-effect and its rival a smaller one. Equilibrium prices, market shares, profit as well 
as total social welfare will be measured to assess the impact of each value of certain 
parameters. In the second part, we construct a dynamic process to test the effect and 
result of the regulatory “sunset clause”. 
4.1  Comparison of the impact of two terminal-charge adjustment 
measures 
Market  share  in  this  discussion  is  set  to  be  25%  versus  75%.  Indeed,  across  the 
European mobile market, the market was dominated by one historical operator with 
another great challenger arriving a short time later, third and fourth (if exist) entrants 
always  suffer  from  a  “never-catching-up”  syndrome
4  explained  by  first  mover 
advantages.  Therefore  defining  such  an  allocation  of  market  shares  is  a  manner  to 
characterize the basic division between the incumbents and later entrants.  
Let’s assume that the tribe effect of the small firm is 10% compared with 30% of the 
larger one, this ratio being proportional to their market shares. To the regulators, the aim 
is  to  both  foster  long-term  competition  by  favouring  the  later  entrant  and  increase 
customer and social welfare. The only parameter that can be set outside the game is the 
MTR, which the regulator can change. We have, therefore, altered this parameter to 
observe the outcome. 
The  effort  to  counterbalance  the  innate  discrepancy  between  two  firms  can  be 
conducted in two ways, either raise the current access charge mark-up of the small firm 
(usually later entrant), or draw the terminal rate of incumbents down to the cost level. 
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Through simulation based on the model presented above, we have two tables of results 
(see Annex Table 7). 
It is obvious that with such a favourable action, Firm1 will no doubt benefit from a 
larger  market  share  as  well  as  a  higher  profit.  Firm2,  i.e.  the  incumbent,  loses  in 
accordance market share and profit. It seems that disequilibrium is disappearing despite 
total welfare and consumer surplus is suffering a decrease thanks to this increase of the 
small firm’s MTR. 
An alternative way to counterbalance the a priori disequilibrium between two firms is 
to lower the MTR’s incumbent towards cost level. Our simulation results are listed in 
Annex Table 8. 
This table indicates a different scenario where market share and profit for the smaller 
firm shows a more effective increase (correspondingly, incumbent suffers more). What 
interests us is the increase of both total welfare and consumer surplus. We made a 
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Figure 1 : Total welfare comparison of increasing MTR1 and decreasing MTR2 What Mobile Termination Regime for Asymmetric Firms with a Calling Club Effect? 
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Figure 2 : Sum of profit of two firms in two scenarios (trend line) 
Figures  1  and  2  show  the  trend  line  of  total  welfare  and  profit  sum  as  a  result  of 
adjustment.  The  trend  line  gives  a  clearer  altering  tendency  compared  with  column 
Figures. All data is unified with respect to the original value which is transformed to 
100 in the Figure’s vertical axis and the scale is zoomed within 80 to 120. As to the 
horizontal axis, the value is marked by the absolute increase or decrease of a1 or a2 for 
the convenience of comparison. 
The two firms’ profit, which is the main part of total welfare, shows a quasi-constant 
level since terminal charges have a profit shift function versus increasing welfare.   What Mobile Termination Regime for Asymmetric Firms with a Calling Club Effect? 
 
  

















Figure 3: Comparison of entrant firm’s profit by increasing MTR1 and decreasing MTR2 
Down to firm1, Figure 3 describes the profit increasing details. Obviously, lowering the 
incumbent’s MTR could provide an entrant with a much more effective increase in its 
profit  compared  to  allowing  it  to  raise  its  own  MTR.  Numerically,  a  45%’s-plus 












Figure 4 : Consumer surplus trend comparison of increasing MTR1 and decreasing MTR2 What Mobile Termination Regime for Asymmetric Firms with a Calling Club Effect? 
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Figure 4 finally indicates the great difference of benefit between the two measures. In 
terms  of  customer  surplus,  cutting  MTR  of  incumbent  may  not  only  double  the 
consumer’s surplus, but also force the incumbent to cut down its on-net price to keep its 
profit (see Table 7 and Table 8).  Certainly, raising entrant’s MTR can have the same 
impact but the dimension is by far negligible. 
 
4.2  Dynamic results 
In this section, still using a dynamic simulation, we explore the possibility of resetting 
market symmetry with the prerequisite of rationality to pursue maximum profit of a 
later entrant’s firm.  
One issue has been mentioned during the discussion dealing with asymmetric market in 
previous  literature:  the  deadline  of  asymmetric  regulation  policy  (if  it  is  to  be 
implemented  for  some  time).    The  “sunset  clause”  advocates  the  presence  of 
asymmetric policy, whereby the later entrant firm can actually practices two strategies 
targeting profit seeking (meaning rent seeking in fact) or at market share gaining. 
Our  model  dynamically  simulates  the  procedure  that  might  take  place  when  the 
regulator gradually shut down favorable asymmetric regulation policy. The entrant does 
not change its pursuit for profit, i.e. it sets its on-net and off-net price just to maximize 
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Figure 5 : Effect of dynamic asymmetric regulation on market share 52 period trial What Mobile Termination Regime for Asymmetric Firms with a Calling Club Effect? 
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Figure 5 shows the impact on market share where the horizontal axis is the unit of 
period. At the beginning, the entrant’s terminal charge is set at a high level. Later on, as 
a result of the asymmetric regulation, the entrant’s market share and club effect increase. 
This new data will be brought into the next period as the basic set-up when the regulator 
slightly decreases the entrant’s terminal charge of the entrant.  
The vertical axis of Figure 5 reflects the percentage change. Initial partitioning of the 
market is 1:3, and can also be considered as the ratio of calling club effect. Over time 
the two firms’ market share tends to converge, even though in a slower pace. In the last 
period, the terminal charges of both firms are equal and market share is 50% vs. 50%. 
With equal partitioning achieved before the whole de-asymmetry process, the regulator 
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Figure 6 : Impact of dynamic asymmetric regulation on profit 
The entrant’s profit increases at almost the same speed as, if not higher than, its market 
share. It is worth noting that profit reached the 50% mark earlier than market share, due 
to higher access charge revenue. The gradual adjustment of asymmetric regulation on 
terminal charge works efficiently without much intervention in the frame of this model.  
In  the  meantime,  our  model  shows  that  it  is  the  length  of  time  and  frequency  of 
adjustment  that  counts,  as  opposed  to  the  total  asymmetry  quantity  granted  to  the 
entrant.  What Mobile Termination Regime for Asymmetric Firms with a Calling Club Effect? 
 
  


















Figure 7 : Comparing the different dynamics of de-asymmetry schemes 
In Figure 7, we compare three possible de-asymmetry regulation schemes. In the model, 
regulators can divide a certain period into 10, 20 or 40 fragments with the initial and 
final value of the entrant’s terminal charge. Specifically, let’s suppose that the regulator 
authorizes the entrant to access mark-up as high as 40, for the case of 10 periods of 
asymmetry, the entrant will in period two to have a mark-up of 36, then 32 in period 3, 
until in the last period it has zero access mark-up, with each period including 4 time 
slots.  
For up to 20-subdivisions, the entrant can have 40 as its access mark-up, then decrease 
38, 36, 34 and until the last zero mark-up, each period lasts 2 time slots. This reasoning 
is the same as for the 40-subdivision case.  
It  is  quite  clear  that  the  more  frequent  the  change  in  asymmetric  regulation  policy 
(decrease of entrant’s access mark-up, to be specific) the more market share the entrant 
will seize by the end of asymmetric regulation. Total profits for entrant gains, follow the 
same law.  
Therefore, we can draw the conclusion that for the dynamic simulation of de-asymmetry 
that when the regulator regularly alters the asymmetric policy on access mark-up for the 
entrant, the latter will automatically regain its market share to maximize its profit (by 
adjusting its on-net and off-net price). During this procedure, it is recommended that the 
regulator should reduce the entrant’s access mark-up and reduce it each time with a 
smaller part. What Mobile Termination Regime for Asymmetric Firms with a Calling Club Effect? 
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5  Conclusion 
The  aim  of  our  paper  was  to  determine  the  efficiency  of  asymmetric  regulation  of 
MTRs in a context where firms are differentiated in size and with commercial offers 
based on calling club effects. Major regulatory issues are related to these analyses, since 
some European National Regulatory Authorities and the European Commission tend to 
question asymmetric regulation due to the maturity of main national markets. But, since 
some of these markets may still be impacted by initial entry delays and various derived 
first mover advantages (brand loyalty, higher calling club effects, switching costs,…), 
our  view  is  that  the  tools  of  asymmetric  regulation  should  still  be  considered  with 
attention and be kept in the scope of NRAs. 
In the context of that debate, our main results are the following: 
•  Asymmetric regulation of MTRs may contribute to increase welfare. If the impact is 
neutral  for  the  firms  (simple  reallocation  of  profits  from  the  large  to  the  small 
player), consumer surplus is augmented. 
•  The appropriate way to proceed is to decrease the larger firm’s MTRs, rather than 
increasing the smaller firm’s ones, that may lead to side effects which are contrary 
to the regulator’s aims. 
•  From a dynamic point of view, asymmetric regulation may contribute to balance 
market shares and, in such a way, erode the first mover advantages (meaning that 
the problem of the “sunset clause” would find a natural solution at the end of the 
game). 
Of course, this process of balancing market shares would make no sense in a national 
context where market shares differences are the result of merits. But, since persistent 
first mover advantages (see Benzoni and Geoffron 2007) seems to still prevail in Europe, 
such regulation tools may not be neglected for the moment, especially given the current 
period of technological transition from 2G to 3G. What Mobile Termination Regime for Asymmetric Firms with a Calling Club Effect? 
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•  Annex  
•  Parameters in the model and simulation 
To make the model more comprehensive and clearer, we will list the parameters that 
correspond to modelling before and the code in the simulation.  









c_on c_on1 or c_on2 1
a a1 or a2 0.5











  ]"1 alpha1 0.22
  ]"2 alpha2 0.78
￿1 profit1 0.0521
￿2 profit2 0.1952
8 W Total social welfare
Fixed fee






market share of firm1
market share of firm2
effect of calling club of firm 1
welfare derived from using telecom service of firm1's client
effect of calling club of firm 2
welfare derived from using telecom service of firm2's client
total cost of a off-net call
Economic signifacation
1/2t, or competition level, or substitution level between firms
a priori unit advantage of incumbent
cost of launch and terminate a call
total cost of a on-net call
terminal access charge
cost of transmitting a call
fixed cost 
ratio of utility in receiving a call to making a call
price elasticity
transport cost in Hotelling model
 
Table 1 : Parameters of model and simulation 
•  Simulation results 
Raw data that we derive from our simulation based on Matlab are presented in this 
section, including: isolated impact of calling club, impact of a priori advantage, impact 
of  substitutability  (competition  level),  impact  of  call  externality  (ratio  of  utility  in 
receiving a call to originating a call) as well as the function of adjusting terminal charge. 
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P_on1 p_off1 p_on2 p_off2 marketshare1 marketshare2 profit1 profit2 Total_welfare Customer_surplus
gama + - + = - + - + - + +
beta + = + = = + - + - - -
tau + - + - + - + -  - then + + +
sigma + - - - - - + - + + +  
Table 2 : Impact of various parameters on indicators 
When the tribe effect for a small firm increases, it has an interest to lower its on-net 
price and raise off-net prices for the intuitive reason that less off-net calls are needed 
and  higher  prices  will  result  in  a  higher  profit.  Total  social  welfare  and  consumer 
surplus head up. 
gama1 p_on1 p_off1 p_on2 p_off2 marketshare1 marketshare2 profit1 profit2 Total Welfare ConsumerSurplus
0.05 1.8 2.125 1.9 2.625 22.01% 77.99% 0.050 0.197 0.582 0.334
0.06 1.7 2.125 1.9 2.625 22.23% 77.77% 0.050 0.197 0.583 0.336
0.07 1.7 2.125 1.9 2.625 22.34% 77.66% 0.051 0.197 0.584 0.336
0.08 1.7 2.125 1.9 2.625 22.45% 77.55% 0.051 0.196 0.584 0.337
0.09 1.6 2.125 1.9 2.500 22.81% 77.19% 0.052 0.195 0.588 0.341
0.10 1.6 2.125 1.9 2.500 22.93% 77.07% 0.052 0.195 0.589 0.341
0.11 1.6 2.125 1.9 2.500 23.06% 76.94% 0.053 0.194 0.589 0.342
0.12 1.6 2.125 1.9 2.500 23.19% 76.81% 0.053 0.194 0.589 0.342
0.13 1.6 2.125 1.9 2.500 23.32% 76.68% 0.053 0.194 0.589 0.342
0.14 1.6 2.125 1.9 2.500 23.45% 76.55% 0.054 0.193 0.589 0.343
0.15 1.6 2.125 1.9 2.500 23.58% 76.42% 0.054 0.193 0.590 0.343
0.16 1.5 2.125 1.9 2.500 24.17% 75.83% 0.054 0.191 0.592 0.346
0.17 1.5 2.125 1.9 2.500 24.33% 75.68% 0.055 0.191 0.592 0.347
0.18 1.5 2.125 1.9 2.375 24.45% 75.55% 0.056 0.190 0.596 0.350
0.19 1.5 2.125 1.9 2.375 24.60% 75.40% 0.056 0.190 0.596 0.350
0.20 1.5 2.250 1.9 2.375 24.51% 75.49% 0.057 0.189 0.593 0.347
0.21 1.5 2.250 1.9 2.375 24.67% 75.33% 0.057 0.189 0.593 0.347
0.22 1.5 2.250 1.9 2.375 24.83% 75.17% 0.057 0.188 0.593 0.348
0.23 1.5 2.250 1.8 2.375 24.38% 75.62% 0.056 0.188 0.609 0.365
0.24 1.5 2.250 1.8 2.375 24.54% 75.46% 0.057 0.187 0.609 0.365  
Table 3 : Impact of calling club effect 
While gama1 is then set at 0.1 is in proportion to their market share ratio, we have the 
following tables for each parameter. 
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beta P_on1 p_off1 p_on2 p_off2 marketshare1 marketshare2 profit1 profit2 Total_welfare ConsumerSurplus
0.15 1.3 2.000 1.9 2.500 14.69% 85.31% 0.0307 0.2153 0.6485 0.4025
0.16 1.3 2.000 1.9 2.500 15.67% 84.33% 0.0327 0.2130 0.6448 0.3991
0.17 1.4 2.000 1.9 2.500 16.08% 83.92% 0.0347 0.2119 0.6403 0.3938
0.18 1.4 2.000 1.9 2.500 16.99% 83.01% 0.0366 0.2097 0.6367 0.3905
0.19 1.4 2.125 1.9 2.500 17.53% 82.47% 0.0385 0.2074 0.6303 0.3843
0.20 1.4 2.125 1.9 2.375 18.40% 81.61% 0.0409 0.2052 0.6294 0.3833
0.21 1.4 2.125 1.9 2.375 19.27% 80.73% 0.0428 0.2030 0.6261 0.3803
0.22 1.4 2.125 1.9 2.375 20.13% 79.88% 0.0447 0.2008 0.6229 0.3774
0.23 1.4 2.125 1.9 2.375 20.97% 79.03% 0.0466 0.1987 0.6198 0.3745
0.24 1.4 2.125 1.9 2.375 21.80% 78.20% 0.0484 0.1966 0.6168 0.3719
0.25 1.4 2.125 1.9 2.375 22.62% 77.38% 0.0502 0.1945 0.6139 0.3693
0.26 1.4 2.250 1.9 2.375 23.19% 76.81% 0.0519 0.1921 0.6077 0.3636
0.27 1.5 2.250 1.9 2.375 23.22% 76.78% 0.0537 0.1920 0.6028 0.3571
0.28 1.5 2.250 1.9 2.375 23.98% 76.02% 0.0555 0.1900 0.5999 0.3544
0.29 1.5 2.250 1.8 2.375 24.12% 75.88% 0.0559 0.1881 0.6124 0.3685
0.30 1.5 2.250 1.8 2.375 24.87% 75.13% 0.0576 0.1861 0.6095 0.3657
0.31 1.5 2.250 1.8 2.375 25.60% 74.40% 0.0594 0.1842 0.6066 0.3630
0.32 1.5 2.250 1.8 2.250 26.21% 73.79% 0.0615 0.1824 0.6072 0.3634
0.33 1.5 2.250 1.8 2.250 26.92% 73.08% 0.0632 0.1806 0.6046 0.3609
0.34 1.5 2.250 1.8 2.250 27.61% 72.39% 0.0648 0.1787 0.6020 0.3584  
Table 4 : Impact of a priori asymmetry 
If asymmetry between two firms becomes smaller (here in simulation, we assume that 
tribe effect is in proportion to asymmetry), every indicator about firm1 increase (or at 
least hold).  
Here, one might be confused by the last column where consumer surplus decreases with 
the  market  becoming  more  symmetric.  The  reason  is  that  here  only  asymmetry  is 
adjusted  while  interconnection  terminal  charges  are  still  fixed  to  a  high  level. T his 
simulation proves that interconnection terminal charge need to be regulated and lead to 
costs, otherwise even symmetric market partitioning might still be used to gain more 
profit from consumers. Symmetric firms are glad, as proven in previous literature, to see 
freely negotiated access charges. 
The economic meaning of beta, as explained in 4.1, is the a priori asymmetry. In other 
words, it shows the percentage of the smaller firm’s market share compared to the larger 
one. However, with the presence of an asymmetric calling club effect, the converging 
equilibrium market share at last is somehow lower than beta for the reason indicated 
above. What Mobile Termination Regime for Asymmetric Firms with a Calling Club Effect? 
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sigma p_on1 p_off1 p_on2 p_off2 marketshare1 marketshare2 profit1 profit2 Total Welfare Consumer Surplus
0.40 1.7 2.125 1.9 2.5 22.76% 77.24% 0.0524 0.1953 0.5580 0.3104
0.41 1.7 2.125 1.9 2.5 22.75% 77.25% 0.0524 0.1953 0.5616 0.3139
0.42 1.7 2.125 1.9 2.5 22.74% 77.26% 0.0523 0.1953 0.5649 0.3173
0.43 1.7 2.125 1.9 2.5 22.74% 77.27% 0.0523 0.1953 0.5681 0.3205
0.44 1.7 2.125 1.9 2.5 22.73% 77.27% 0.0523 0.1953 0.5712 0.3235
0.45 1.7 2.125 1.9 2.5 22.72% 77.28% 0.0523 0.1954 0.5741 0.3264
0.46 1.7 2.125 1.9 2.5 22.71% 77.29% 0.0523 0.1954 0.5769 0.3292
0.47 1.6 2.125 1.9 2.5 22.94% 77.06% 0.0523 0.1948 0.5812 0.3341
0.48 1.6 2.125 1.9 2.5 22.94% 77.06% 0.0523 0.1948 0.5838 0.3367
0.49 1.6 2.125 1.9 2.5 22.94% 77.06% 0.0522 0.1948 0.5862 0.3391
0.50 1.6 2.125 1.9 2.5 22.93% 77.07% 0.0522 0.1948 0.5886 0.3415
0.51 1.6 2.125 1.9 2.5 22.93% 77.07% 0.0522 0.1948 0.5908 0.3438
0.52 1.6 2.125 1.9 2.5 22.93% 77.07% 0.0522 0.1949 0.5930 0.3459
0.53 1.6 2.125 1.9 2.5 22.93% 77.07% 0.0522 0.1949 0.5951 0.3480
0.54 1.6 2.125 1.8 2.5 22.27% 77.73% 0.0507 0.1949 0.6130 0.3675
0.55 1.6 2.125 1.8 2.5 22.25% 77.75% 0.0507 0.1949 0.6150 0.3694
0.56 1.6 2.125 1.8 2.5 22.24% 77.76% 0.0506 0.1950 0.6169 0.3713
0.57 1.6 2.000 1.8 2.5 22.66% 77.34% 0.0506 0.1951 0.6223 0.3766
0.58 1.6 2.000 1.8 2.5 22.65% 77.35% 0.0506 0.1951 0.6241 0.3784
0.59 1.6 2.000 1.8 2.5 22.65% 77.35% 0.0506 0.1951 0.6257 0.3800  
Table 5 : Impact of substitutability (competition level) 
When substitutability is increased by 50%, neither profit nor market share of two firms 
show great changes. Consumer surplus, however, is increased by 22.5%. Thus this table 
justifies the basic idea of fostering competition. 
tau p_on1 p_off1 p_on2 p_off2 marketshare1 marketshare2 profit1 profit2 Total Welfare consumer surplus
0.10 1.7 1.875 1.9 2.000 23.92% 76.08% 0.0554 0.1934 0.5033        0.2545                
0.11 1.7 1.875 1.9 2.000 23.89% 76.11% 0.0553 0.1935 0.5138        0.2650                
0.12 1.7 1.875 1.9 2.125 24.16% 75.84% 0.0550 0.1937 0.5212        0.2725                
0.13 1.7 1.875 1.9 2.125 24.08% 75.92% 0.0548 0.1939 0.5317        0.2830                
0.14 1.7 2.000 1.9 2.250 23.55% 76.45% 0.0544 0.1942 0.5353        0.2867                
0.15 1.7 2.000 1.9 2.250 23.48% 76.52% 0.0542 0.1944 0.5456        0.2970                
0.16 1.7 2.000 1.9 2.250 23.40% 76.60% 0.0540 0.1946 0.5559        0.3073                
0.17 1.7 2.000 1.9 2.375 23.40% 76.60% 0.0534 0.1948 0.5631        0.3149                
0.18 1.7 2.000 1.9 2.375 23.30% 76.70% 0.0532 0.1950 0.5733        0.3251                
0.19 1.6 2.125 1.9 2.500 23.03% 76.97% 0.0525 0.1946 0.5784        0.3313                
0.20 1.6 2.125 1.9 2.500 22.93% 77.07% 0.0522 0.1948 0.5886        0.3415                
0.21 1.6 2.125 1.9 2.625 22.79% 77.21% 0.0515 0.1951 0.5958        0.3492                
0.22 1.6 2.125 1.9 2.750 22.61% 77.39% 0.0506 0.1954 0.6031        0.3571                
0.23 1.6 2.250 1.9 2.750 22.20% 77.80% 0.0503 0.1955 0.6095        0.3638                
0.24 1.6 2.250 1.8 2.875 21.32% 78.68% 0.0479 0.1958 0.6350        0.3912                
0.25 1.6 2.250 1.8 3.000 21.05% 78.95% 0.0471 0.1962 0.6431        0.3998                
0.26 1.6 2.250 1.8 3.125 20.75% 79.25% 0.0461 0.1967 0.6514        0.4086                
0.27 1.5 2.250 1.8 3.250 20.76% 79.24% 0.0452 0.1963 0.6613        0.4197                
0.28 1.5 2.375 1.8 3.375 20.31% 79.69% 0.0443 0.1964 0.6663        0.4256                
0.29 1.5 2.375 1.8 3.500 19.98% 80.03% 0.0434 0.1969 0.6750        0.4347                  
Table 6 : Impact of calling externality 
Receiving-call’s utility contributes to the reduction of on-net price of both side as well 
as increase of profit, welfare and consumer surplus. 
When  beta=0.3,sigma=0.2,gama1=0.1,gama2=0.3,tau=0.1,  we  show  the  impact  of 
adjusting the interconnection terminal charge. What Mobile Termination Regime for Asymmetric Firms with a Calling Club Effect? 
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a1 p_on1 p_off1 p_on2 p_off2 marketshare1 marketshare2 profit1_by_raising_a1 profit2 Total_welfare_raising_a1 Customer_surplus_raising_a1
0.70 1.9 2.61 2.0 2.61 22.63% 77.37% 0.0521 0.1941 0.2860 0.0399
0.73 1.9 2.61 2.0 2.66 22.67% 77.33% 0.0524 0.1935 0.2850 0.0391
0.76 1.9 2.61 2.0 2.72 22.71% 77.29% 0.0526 0.1930 0.2841 0.0384
0.79 1.9 2.61 2.0 2.77 22.75% 77.25% 0.0529 0.1926 0.2831 0.0377
0.82 1.9 2.61 2.0 2.83 22.78% 77.22% 0.0531 0.1921 0.2822 0.0371
0.85 1.9 2.61 2.0 2.88 22.82% 77.18% 0.0533 0.1916 0.2813 0.0364
0.88 1.9 2.61 2.0 2.93 22.85% 77.15% 0.0535 0.1912 0.2805 0.0358
0.91 1.9 2.61 2.0 2.99 22.88% 77.12% 0.0536 0.1908 0.2796 0.0352
0.94 1.9 2.61 2.0 3.04 22.92% 77.09% 0.0538 0.1904 0.2788 0.0346
0.97 1.9 2.61 2.0 3.10 22.95% 77.06% 0.0539 0.1900 0.2780 0.0341
1.00 1.9 2.61 2.0 3.15 22.97% 77.03% 0.0541 0.1896 0.2772 0.0335
1.03 1.9 2.61 2.0 3.20 23.00% 77.00% 0.0542 0.1892 0.2764 0.0330
1.06 1.9 2.61 2.0 3.26 23.03% 76.97% 0.0543 0.1889 0.2756 0.0325
1.09 1.9 2.61 2.0 3.31 23.06% 76.95% 0.0544 0.1885 0.2749 0.0320
1.12 1.9 2.61 2.0 3.37 23.08% 76.92% 0.0545 0.1882 0.2742 0.0315
1.15 1.9 2.61 2.0 3.42 23.11% 76.90% 0.0545 0.1879 0.2735 0.0311
1.18 1.9 2.61 1.9 3.47 22.96% 77.04% 0.0542 0.1876 0.2844 0.0427
1.21 1.9 2.61 1.9 3.53 22.98% 77.02% 0.0543 0.1873 0.2837 0.0422
1.24 1.9 2.61 1.9 3.58 23.00% 77.00% 0.0543 0.1870 0.2831 0.0418
1.27 1.9 2.61 1.9 3.64 23.03% 76.97% 0.0544 0.1867 0.2824 0.0414  
Table 7 : Impact of raising smaller firm’s terminal access charges 
a2 P_on1 p_off1 p_on2 p_off2 marketshare1 marketshare2 profit1 profit2 Total_welfare Customer_surplus
0.70 1.9 2.61 2.0 2.61 22.63% 77.37% 0.0521 0.1941 0.2860 0.040
0.67 1.9 2.56 2.0 2.61 22.71% 77.29% 0.0528 0.1936 0.2871 0.041
0.64 1.9 2.50 2.0 2.61 22.79% 77.21% 0.0536 0.1931 0.2882 0.041
0.61 1.9 2.31 2.0 2.61 23.10% 76.90% 0.0544 0.1931 0.2923 0.045
0.58 1.9 2.26 2.0 2.61 23.19% 76.81% 0.0553 0.1924 0.2935 0.046
0.55 1.9 2.21 2.0 2.61 23.29% 76.71% 0.0562 0.1917 0.2947 0.047
0.52 1.9 2.16 2.0 2.61 23.39% 76.61% 0.0572 0.1909 0.2959 0.048
0.49 1.9 2.11 2.0 2.61 23.50% 76.50% 0.0582 0.1900 0.2971 0.049
0.46 1.9 2.06 2.0 2.61 23.61% 76.39% 0.0592 0.1890 0.2984 0.050
0.43 1.9 2.01 2.0 2.61 23.73% 76.27% 0.0604 0.1879 0.2997 0.051
0.40 1.9 1.96 1.9 2.61 23.69% 76.32% 0.0611 0.1867 0.3124 0.065
0.37 1.9 1.90 1.9 2.61 23.82% 76.19% 0.0624 0.1853 0.3137 0.066
0.34 1.9 1.85 1.9 2.61 23.95% 76.05% 0.0637 0.1838 0.3150 0.067
0.31 1.9 1.80 1.9 2.61 24.10% 75.90% 0.0651 0.1822 0.3163 0.069
0.28 1.9 1.75 1.9 2.61 24.25% 75.75% 0.0666 0.1803 0.3176 0.071
0.25 1.9 1.70 1.9 2.61 24.42% 75.58% 0.0682 0.1782 0.3189 0.072
0.22 1.9 1.65 1.9 2.61 24.59% 75.41% 0.0699 0.1759 0.3201 0.074
0.19 1.9 1.60 1.9 2.61 24.78% 75.23% 0.0718 0.1733 0.3214 0.076
0.16 1.9 1.55 1.9 2.61 24.97% 75.03% 0.0738 0.1704 0.3225 0.078
0.13 1.9 1.50 1.9 2.61 25.18% 74.82% 0.0759 0.1670 0.3237 0.081  
Table 8 : Impact of lowering incumbent’s terminal access charges What Mobile Termination Regime for Asymmetric Firms with a Calling Club Effect? 
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a1 a2 p_on1 p_off1 p_on2 p_off2 marketshare1 marketshare2 profit1 profit2
0.76 0.25 1.9 1.7 1.9 2.718 24.5% 75.5% 0.06881 0.17713
0.75 0.25 1.9 1.7 1.9 2.700 25.9% 74.1% 0.07249 0.17342
0.74 0.25 1.9 1.8 1.9 2.682 26.9% 73.1% 0.07608 0.17068
0.73 0.25 1.9 1.8 1.9 2.664 27.9% 72.1% 0.07876 0.16803
0.72 0.25 1.9 1.8 1.9 2.646 28.9% 71.1% 0.08137 0.16546
0.71 0.25 1.9 1.8 1.9 2.628 29.9% 70.1% 0.08389 0.16298
0.7 0.25 1.9 1.8 1.9 2.610 30.9% 69.1% 0.08634 0.16058
0.69 0.25 1.9 1.8 1.9 2.592 31.8% 68.2% 0.08872 0.15827
0.68 0.25 1.9 1.8 1.9 2.574 32.7% 67.3% 0.09102 0.15603
0.67 0.25 1.9 1.8 1.9 2.556 33.6% 66.4% 0.09324 0.15387
0.66 0.25 1.9 1.8 1.9 2.679 34.5% 65.5% 0.09462 0.15180
0.65 0.25 1.9 1.8 1.9 2.660 35.4% 64.6% 0.09695 0.14954
0.64 0.25 1.9 1.8 1.9 2.641 36.3% 63.7% 0.09922 0.14736
0.63 0.25 1.9 1.8 1.9 2.622 37.2% 62.8% 0.10140 0.14525
0.62 0.25 1.9 1.8 1.9 2.603 38.1% 61.9% 0.10352 0.14322
0.61 0.25 1.9 1.8 1.9 2.584 38.9% 61.1% 0.10557 0.14126
0.6 0.25 1.9 1.8 1.9 2.565 39.8% 60.3% 0.10755 0.13937
0.59 0.25 1.9 1.8 1.9 2.546 40.5% 59.5% 0.10947 0.13755
0.58 0.25 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.527 41.1% 58.9% 0.11132 0.13627
0.57 0.25 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.508 41.7% 58.3% 0.11265 0.13503
0.56 0.25 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.489 42.3% 57.7% 0.11394 0.13384
0.55 0.25 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.470 42.8% 57.2% 0.11518 0.13270
0.54 0.25 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.451 43.3% 56.7% 0.11636 0.13161
0.53 0.25 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.432 43.9% 56.1% 0.11750 0.13057
0.52 0.25 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.413 44.4% 55.6% 0.11858 0.12958
0.51 0.25 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.394 44.8% 55.2% 0.11962 0.12864
0.5 0.25 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.375 45.3% 54.7% 0.12060 0.12775
0.49 0.25 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.356 45.7% 54.3% 0.12153 0.12690
0.48 0.25 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.337 46.2% 53.8% 0.12242 0.12611
0.47 0.25 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.318 46.6% 53.4% 0.12325 0.12536
0.46 0.25 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.299 47.0% 53.0% 0.12403 0.12466
0.45 0.25 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.280 47.3% 52.7% 0.12476 0.12401
0.44 0.25 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.261 47.7% 52.3% 0.12544 0.12341
0.43 0.25 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.242 48.1% 51.9% 0.12606 0.12286
0.42 0.25 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.223 48.4% 51.6% 0.12663 0.12236
0.41 0.25 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.204 48.7% 51.3% 0.12715 0.12191
0.4 0.25 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.185 49.0% 51.0% 0.12761 0.12151
0.39 0.25 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.166 49.3% 50.7% 0.12802 0.12115
0.38 0.25 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.147 49.5% 50.5% 0.12837 0.12085
0.37 0.25 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.128 49.7% 50.3% 0.12866 0.12061
0.36 0.25 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.109 50.0% 50.0% 0.12890 0.12041  
Table 9 : Dynamic  regulation 52 periods (interrupted at 40th periods) What Mobile Termination Regime for Asymmetric Firms with a Calling Club Effect? 
 
  
                                        25   
a1 a2 p_on1 p_off1 p_on2 p_off2 marketshare1 marketshare2 profit1 profit2
0.885 0.30 1.9 1.785 1.9 2.943 24.37% 75.63% 0.0671 0.1785
0.870 0.30 1.9 1.785 1.9 2.916 25.63% 74.37% 0.0704 0.1752
0.855 0.30 1.9 1.89 1.9 2.889 26.57% 73.43% 0.0737 0.1725
0.840 0.30 1.9 1.89 1.9 2.862 27.49% 72.51% 0.0761 0.1702
0.825 0.30 1.9 1.89 1.9 2.835 28.38% 71.62% 0.0784 0.1679
0.810 0.30 1.9 1.89 1.9 2.808 29.25% 70.75% 0.0806 0.1658
0.795 0.30 1.9 1.89 1.9 2.781 30.10% 69.90% 0.0828 0.1637
0.780 0.30 1.9 1.89 1.9 2.754 30.93% 69.07% 0.0849 0.1617
0.765 0.30 1.9 1.89 1.9 2.727 31.73% 68.27% 0.0869 0.1597
0.750 0.30 1.9 1.89 1.9 2.700 32.51% 67.49% 0.0889 0.1579
0.735 0.30 1.9 1.89 1.9 2.673 33.26% 66.74% 0.0908 0.1561
0.720 0.30 1.9 1.89 1.9 2.793 34.09% 65.91% 0.0918 0.1545
0.705 0.30 1.9 1.89 1.9 2.765 34.90% 65.10% 0.0938 0.1526
0.690 0.30 1.9 1.89 1.9 2.736 35.68% 64.32% 0.0957 0.1508
0.675 0.30 1.9 1.89 1.9 2.708 36.44% 63.56% 0.0975 0.1491
0.660 0.30 1.9 1.89 1.9 2.679 37.18% 62.82% 0.0993 0.1475
0.645 0.30 1.9 1.89 1.9 2.651 37.89% 62.11% 0.1010 0.1459
0.630 0.30 1.9 1.89 1.9 2.622 38.58% 61.42% 0.1026 0.1444
0.615 0.30 1.9 1.89 1.9 2.594 39.25% 60.75% 0.1042 0.1430
0.600 0.30 1.9 1.89 1.9 2.565 39.90% 60.11% 0.1057 0.1417
0.585 0.30 1.9 1.89 1.9 2.537 40.52% 59.49% 0.1071 0.1405
0.570 0.30 1.9 1.995 1.9 2.508 40.94% 59.06% 0.1084 0.1394
0.555 0.30 1.9 1.995 1.9 2.480 41.35% 58.65% 0.1092 0.1388
0.540 0.30 1.9 1.995 1.9 2.451 41.73% 58.27% 0.1100 0.1381
0.525 0.30 1.9 1.995 1.9 2.423 42.09% 57.91% 0.1107 0.1376
0.510 0.30 1.9 1.995 1.9 2.394 42.44% 57.57% 0.1113 0.1371
0.495 0.30 1.9 1.995 1.9 2.366 42.75% 57.25% 0.1118 0.1367
0.480 0.30 1.9 1.995 1.9 2.337 43.05% 56.95% 0.1123 0.1364
0.465 0.30 1.9 1.995 1.9 2.309 43.32% 56.68% 0.1127 0.1361
0.450 0.30 1.9 1.995 1.9 2.280 43.58% 56.43% 0.1130 0.1359
0.435 0.30 1.9 1.995 1.9 2.252 43.80% 56.20% 0.1132 0.1358
0.420 0.30 1.9 1.995 1.9 2.223 44.00% 56.00% 0.1134 0.1357
0.405 0.30 1.9 1.995 1.9 2.195 44.18% 55.82% 0.1135 0.1358
0.390 0.30 1.9 1.995 1.9 2.166 44.33% 55.67% 0.1134 0.1359
0.375 0.30 1.9 1.995 1.9 2.138 44.45% 55.55% 0.1133 0.1361
0.360 0.30 1.9 1.995 1.9 2.109 44.55% 55.45% 0.1131 0.1363
0.345 0.30 1.9 1.995 1.9 2.081 44.62% 55.39% 0.1128 0.1367
0.330 0.30 1.9 1.995 1.9 2.052 44.65% 55.35% 0.1124 0.1371
0.315 0.30 1.9 1.995 1.9 2.024 44.66% 55.34% 0.1119 0.1377
0.300 0.30 1.9 1.995 1.9 1.995 44.64% 55.36% 0.1112 0.1383  
Table 10 : Dynamic regulation 40 periods What Mobile Termination Regime for Asymmetric Firms with a Calling Club Effect? 
 
  
                                        26   
a1 a2 p_on1 p_off1 p_on2 p_off2 marketshare1 marketshare2 profit1 profit2
0.87 0.3 1.9 1.785 1.9 2.916 24.35% 75.65% 0.0670 0.1787
0.84 0.3 1.9 1.785 1.9 2.862 25.58% 74.42% 0.0702 0.1757
0.81 0.3 1.9 1.89 1.9 2.808 26.47% 73.53% 0.0732 0.1734
0.78 0.3 1.9 1.89 1.9 2.754 27.32% 72.68% 0.0753 0.1715
0.75 0.3 1.9 1.89 1.9 2.700 28.13% 71.88% 0.0773 0.1697
0.72 0.3 1.9 1.89 1.9 2.646 28.89% 71.11% 0.0791 0.1681
0.69 0.3 1.9 1.89 1.9 2.592 29.61% 70.39% 0.0808 0.1667
0.66 0.3 1.9 1.89 1.9 2.538 30.29% 69.71% 0.0823 0.1654
0.63 0.3 1.9 1.89 1.9 2.484 30.92% 69.08% 0.0837 0.1643
0.60 0.3 1.9 1.89 1.9 2.430 31.50% 68.50% 0.0848 0.1634
0.57 0.3 1.9 1.89 1.9 2.376 32.04% 67.97% 0.0859 0.1626
0.54 0.3 1.9 1.89 1.9 2.451 32.63% 67.37% 0.0861 0.1620
0.51 0.3 1.9 1.89 1.9 2.394 33.18% 66.82% 0.0871 0.1613
0.48 0.3 1.9 1.89 1.9 2.337 33.67% 66.33% 0.0878 0.1607
0.45 0.3 1.9 1.89 1.9 2.280 34.11% 65.89% 0.0884 0.1604
0.42 0.3 1.9 1.89 1.9 2.223 34.50% 65.50% 0.0887 0.1603
0.39 0.3 1.9 1.89 1.9 2.166 34.83% 65.18% 0.0889 0.1603
0.36 0.3 1.9 1.89 1.9 2.109 35.09% 64.91% 0.0887 0.1606
0.33 0.3 1.9 1.89 1.9 2.052 35.30% 64.70% 0.0883 0.1610
0.30 0.3 1.9 1.89 1.9 1.995 35.44% 64.56% 0.0877 0.1617  
Table 11 : Dynamic  regulation 20 periods 
a1 a2 p_on1 p_off1 p_on2 p_off2 marketshare1 marketshare2 profit1 profit2
0.84 0.3 1.9 1.785 1.9 2.862 24.32% 75.68% 0.0668 0.1792
0.78 0.3 1.9 1.785 1.9 2.754 25.48% 74.52% 0.0696 0.1768
0.72 0.3 1.9 1.89 1.9 2.646 26.26% 73.74% 0.0721 0.1753
0.66 0.3 1.9 1.89 1.9 2.538 26.95% 73.05% 0.0735 0.1744
0.60 0.3 1.9 1.89 1.9 2.430 27.55% 72.45% 0.0745 0.1738
0.54 0.3 1.9 1.89 1.9 2.322 28.06% 71.94% 0.0750 0.1737
0.48 0.3 1.9 1.89 1.9 2.214 28.45% 71.55% 0.0751 0.1740
0.42 0.3 1.9 1.89 1.9 2.106 28.73% 71.27% 0.0746 0.1747
0.36 0.3 1.9 1.89 1.9 1.998 28.89% 71.12% 0.0734 0.1760
0.30 0.3 1.9 1.89 2 1.890 29.05% 70.95% 0.0719 0.1778  
Table 12 : Dynamic  regulation 10 periods 
 